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NSC BRIEFINGNEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

REVIEWER

15 April 1957<sub>25X1</sub>

KISHI'S "EQUALITY" PROPOSALS

- I. Japan's Prime Minister Kishi is staking his political future on his ability both to readjust US-Japanese relations on a basis of "true equality" and to steer Japan towards a more "independent" foreign policy.
  - A. In pursuit of these objectives, Kishi on 13 Apr presented to US Amb. MacArthur a number of far-reaching proposals which have serious implications for American security interests in the Far East.
- II. First proposal deals with US-Japanese security arrangements. Kishi suggested both countries reaffirm:
  - A. That these security arrangements are aimed at maintaining world peace, that the US will not use its forces except to meet overt aggression, and that neither government will support attempts by any Far Eastern country to further national policies by military force.
    - 1. Latter thought is obvious slap at Rhee, Chiang.
  - B. Kishi also asked that security treaty be specifically revised so that Japan will have a voice in disposition and use of US forces stationed there.
    - 1. Kishi wants a maximum withdrawal of all US forces, complete withdrawal of US ground troops.
    - 2. Wants treaty to include a five-year limit, after which either party could terminate on one year's notice.
    - 3. Wants US bases reduced to a minimum, but kept in a state of readiness for emergency.

- C. Japanese regard present security treaty a symbol of Japan's "subordination" to US.
  - 1. They criticize fact that treaty grants US the right to use bases and forces in Japan for purposes irrelevent to Japan's defense and without Japanese approval.
  - 2. Many Japanese believe US foreign policy aims ultimately at war to overthrow the Communist bloc, and that the present security arrangements with the US will draw Japan into such a war against its will.
- III. Kishi's second proposal is that the US return full control of Okinawa and the Bonins to Japan within ten years or earlier.
  - A. He suggested that Bonin Islanders now in Japan be permitted to return to their homes gradually.
  - B. Strong Japanese feeling about islands stems not only from usual irredentism, but also from belief they were unjustly seized by US since they were not included in Cairo declaration.
    - 1. Japanese are beginning to have doubts that US ever intends to return islands.
- IV. Kishi also told MacArthur that he wished to discuss outstanding differences on China in near future.
  - A. We have indications that Japan may soon exchange trade missions with Peiping, a significant step toward de facto relations.
  - B. Japanese Gov't also plans to participate more directly in trade and repatriation talks with Peiping.
- V. We believe Kishi is convinced of Japan's interest in maintaining close ties with the US and that he is basically friendly to Western interests.

- A. These proposals probably represent his maximum position for his impending Washington talks (June '57). He could settle for substantially less and still present Japan with a "victory" on his return.
- B. Kishi feels, however, that the "basic spirit" of the USJapanese relationship must be changed--that "Japan must have an
  independent foreign policy and must decide its own destinies."
- C. Up to now, Kishi has found it expedient to "swim with the tide" on US-Japanese differences to build up his own popular support and prevent the Socialists from exploiting popular anti-US issues.
- D. Whether, following some token "victory", Kishi will assert positive leadership, as he says is his intention, to correct Japanese misunderstanding over American motivations remains to be seen.